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Abstract
With the increase in internet users, E-Commerce has been grown exponentially in
recent years. E-Auction is one among them. But its security and robustness is still
a challenge. The electronic auction centers remain to be insecure and anonymity,
bid privacy and other requirements are under the threat by malicious hackers. Any
auction protocol must not leak the anonymity and bid privacy of an honest bidder.
Keeping these requirements in mind, we have proposed a new electronic auction
scheme using blind signature. Moreover our scheme is based upon elliptic curve
cryptography which provides similar level of security with comparatively smaller
key size. Due to the smaller key size, the space requirement can be reduced which
further allows our E-Auction scheme to implement in a mobile application which has
a constrained environment like low bandwidth, memory and computational power.
Blind signature is a special kind of digital signature where the message privacy
can be retained by blinding the message and getting a signature on that. It can be
universally veriﬁable and signer can’t repudiate of signing the document. Moreover
it also satisﬁes the integrity and authenticity of the message. Due to these features
of a blind signature, it can easily be applied on an E-Auction scheme. So we
have proposed an eﬃcient blind signature protocol according to the requirements
of E-Auction which is based upon the hard problem of solving elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem(ECDLP). Then we have successfully applied it in our E-Auction
scheme.
In this thesis, we developed an Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
(ECDLP) based blind signature scheme which can be implemented on our E-Auction
protocol. Both the schemes are proved to be resistant to active attacks and satisﬁes
the requirements which are necessary for online auction.
Keywords: Cryptography, E-Auction, Blind Signature, Elliptic Curve
Cryptography
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter we have discussed about the fundamental ideas and terms related
to cryptography which are necessary for completion of the dissertation. We have
also deﬁne brieﬂy digital signature and its services and subsequently describe blind
signature which is a variation of digital signature and its properties. Further we
have elaborated the necessity and properties of E-Auction and ﬁnally the layout of
the thesis is given.
1.1 Introduction to Cryptography
We are living in an electronic world where information plays a crucial role. We
need data in our day to day activities. Data are like an inevitable need of our life
these days. At the same time its security is of great concern. In this electronic
era data need to be protected from third parties with whom we may not want to
disclose our information. In early days people used to write a message and cover the
message itself with something in order to protect the message from any adversary.
This technology is known as steganography. Then people adopt a more relevant and
secure technology called cryptography.
Cryptography is the technology to transform a message to an unintelligible
one in order to make it secure and immune to attacks by any adversary. During
communication it pays high attention on the transmission of the message and should
1
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be reluctant to any kind of attack by the adversaries. Mathematical theory and
computer science practice are the heart of modern cryptography; cryptographic
algorithms are based on computational hardness, making such algorithms infeasible
for any adversary to break in practice. Theoretically it is possible to break such a
system but it is infeasible to do so by any known practical means. There are so
many computationally hard algorithms which seem to be unbreakable like integer
factorization, discrete logarithm problem. But with time, technology is getting
advance and many techniques are vulnerable to attacks. Hence researchers are
constantly trying to develop new algorithms like Elliptic Curve discrete logarithm,
Hyper Elliptic Curve, Quantum Theories etc..
While communicating a message we deal with three main aspects of security,
ﬁrst Conﬁdentiality i.e hiding the content of the message from an unauthorized
person, second Integrity i.e the content of the message should not be modiﬁed by
an unauthorized person and third Availability i.e the message should be available
to the authorized person when desired. There are two parties involve in a typical
message transmission, the sender and the receiver(s). The sender encrypt the plain
text message to get a cipher text message and send the same over a communication
channel. Then the receiver decrypt the cipher text message to get back the plain
text message. Any eavesdropper unable to decrypt the message if the encryption
algorithm is strong enough. There are broadly two types of cryptographic technique
exist. .
Symmetric key/Private key cryptosystem, where the sender and the receiver(s)
share the same key and is hidden to others. The examples of such system includes
Data Encryption Standard (DES), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Blowﬁsh
etc. These systems are usually faster. Here the major problem is the key distribution
and key agreement when everyone wants to communicate with each other. Suppose
there are n members in a group who wants to communicate with each other. Then
they will need n(n − 1)/2 numbers of keys. Moreover both the parties need to
2
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pre agree on the secret key prior to the communication. It seems ineﬃcient with
regard to key distribution and key agreement and to avoid these drawbacks Diﬃe
and Hellman [7] proposed a scheme where both the sender and the receiver can
agree on a secret key without prior communication and that led to another kind of
cryptosystem called Asymmetric key/ Public key cryptosystem.
In Asymmetric key/Public key cryptosystem, every sender and receiver require
a set of two keys, a private key and a public key. The sender encrypt the plain
text message using the public key of the receiver and the receiver decrypt the cipher
text message using his private key which is known only to him. An eavesdropper
can’t decrypt the cipher text message because he doesn’t have the private key of
the receiver. The examples of such system includes RSA, Rabin cryptosystem,
ElGamal, Elliptic curve, Hyper Elliptic curve cryptosystem etc. The major drawback
associated with these systems is the computational cost and hence they are usually
slower as compared to Symmetric key system. One of the basic security services,
conﬁdentiality in public key system is achieved through encryption/decryption
algorithm which is known as encipherment whereas integrity, authenticity and
nonrepudiation is achieved through another mechanism called Digital Signature.
1.2 Digital Signature
A conventional signature is requirement of proof to the recipient that the document
is originated from a valid entity. A digital signature is the counter part of the
conventional signature where some mathematical function is used to calculate the
signature from the desired message and can be veriﬁed by the veriﬁers. A digital
signature requires a public key system where the signer signs the message with
his private key and the veriﬁers verify it using the signer’s public key [8]. Digital
Signature is one of the security mechanisms that satisﬁes the following security
services.
• Authenticity: The authenticity of the message or data origin authentication
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can be achieved by digital signature as the message signed using A’s private
key can only be veriﬁed using A’s public key.
• Integrity: The integrity of the message can be preserved if we sign a document
because if we modify the message the signature will also be changed and will
not be the same during veriﬁcation.
• Nonrepudiation: Though directly we can’t achieve nonrepudiation through
digital signature, but with a trusted third party nonrepudiation can be
achievable.
Some well-known digital signature primitives are RSA digital signature scheme,
ElGamal digital signature scheme, Schnorr digital signature scheme, Digital
Signature Standard, Elliptic Curve digital signature scheme [9]. We can achieve
additional security services by applying additional functionalities to digital signature.
Conﬁdentiality is not provided by digital signature. It can be provided by applying
another layer of encryption/decryption. Similarly in real life situations we don’t
want to reveal the content of the message to the signer in order to maintain the
conﬁdentiality of the message. In such cases a Blind signature serves the purpose.
1.3 Blind Signature
Blind signature is a variation to the digital signature where the signer is unaware of
the content of the message to be signed by him. In order to protect the conﬁdentiality
of the message,
• The sender uses a blinding factor to blind the message and send it to the signer
to get the signature.
• Signer puts his signature on the blinded message and returns the blinded
message signature pair.
4
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• Sender unblinds the blind signature to get a valid signature on the original
message which can be publicly veriﬁed.
David Chaum [10] introduced blind signature for the purpose to provide
anonymity to the spender in an electronic cash system. A blind signature prevents
the signer from observing the message signed by him. So it will be impossible for
the signer to associate the signature and the original message even later. Blind
signature is essential where privacy is of great concern for example Electronic Cash,
Electronic Voting, Electronic Auction etc. Blind signature scheme can be used to
achieve the unlink-ability property which prevents the signer to link to a previously
signed blind message to a corresponding un-blind message. The general public key
algorithms those are used for digital signature can be used for blind signature with
some modiﬁcation in order to achieve desired functionality.
1.4 Level of Security in Cryptography
In public key cryptosystem encipherment mechanism is used to provide
conﬁdentiality where as Digital signature is used to provide authenticity, integrity
and nonrepudiation in general. Any cryptographic algorithm can be computed in
terms of security bits and that depends on the level of security. The level of security
is broadly divided in to the following three categories.
• Integer Factorization Problem: Given only a Composite number n, which
is the product of two large prime numbers p and q then it will be diﬃcult to
factorize n. Eg. RSA, Rabin cryptosystem.
• Discrete Logarithm Problem: Given an integer x relatively prime to n and
g is a primitive root of n, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd y such that x = gy(m
¯
odn). Eg.
Diﬃe Hellman, ElGamal cryptosystem, DSA. .
• Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem: Given a point P = k.G,
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where G is the generator, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd the scalar k. Eg. Elliptic Curve
Cryptography.
1.5 Introduction to E-Auction
Advancement of science and technology has replaced most human procedures into
electronic ones and E-Auction is one among them. E-auction is an important
ﬁnancial transaction to establish the price of commodities over a distributed
environment. Typically in an electronic auction system there are three parties
involved namely bidders, auctioneer and a third party who provides an environment
to conduct the auction. The auctioneer provides all the detailed information about
his goods, commodities or services to the third party which publishes it on the
internet. Then bidders can submit their bid for the product which is advertised
within a speciﬁed period. The auction is transparent, all interested parties are
allowed to participate the auction in a timely manner [3–5].
Internet provides us a unique distributed environment where an auction can be
performed. The wide use of Internet makes it possible to conduct online distributed
auction instead of centralized auction. Centralized auction has several demerits like,
physical limitation, geography, time, transparency and is diﬃcult to reach to wide
mass etc. To overcome these drawbacks E-auction scheme was introduced. But
E-Auction has some challenges like Bidder’s anonymity, bid privacy etc. In this
thesis we have tried to give a solution that satisﬁes most properties of an E-Auction
there by avoiding the typical problems associated with it.
There are two major forms of the electronic auctions.
Forward Auction: In this auction style several buyers bid for one seller’s goods.
In such kind of auction bidders compete to pursue the product by repetitively bidding
over a bid value within a stipulated time period. The highest bid will be the ﬁnal
bid and the bidder will be determined as the winner.
Reverse Auction: In this auction style several sellers bid for one buyer’s order.
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In a reverse auction, a single buyer makes potential sellers aware of their intent to
buy a speciﬁed good or service. During the course of the actual reverse auction
event, the sellers bid against one another.
This thesis gives a generalized approach for conducting E-Auction and hence can
be applicable to both auction styles. Moreover E-Auction schemes can be divided
in to four basic types.
1. English Auction: It is also known as open outcry auction. In this type of
auction bidders proﬀer successively until there is only one bidder left with the
ﬁnal bidding value. The highest bid is considered as ﬁnal bid and has to be
paid by the bidder in order to possess the item.
2. Dutch Auction: It is also known as open outcry descending auction. As
the name suggests, it works in a reverse manner of English auction. Here
auctioneer starts with a very high price and lowers the price subsequently.
The bidder who calls out ﬁrst will accept the current bid and pays the amount
in order to possess the item.
3. Sealed Bid Auction: Here every bidder submits their single bid without
the knowledge of other bidders’ bid. The auctioneer declare the result after
a stipulated time. The bidder with the highest bid can possess the item by
paying his bid amount.
4. Vickrey Auction: It is similar to sealed bid auction except the bidder with
the highest bid will win but pays the second highest bid. This scheme is named
so after William Vickrey, an economist who won noble prize for his seminal,
1961 paper on auction theory.
According to the properties of Sealed bid auction it is always easy to implement
it in an electronic auction. Open outcry auction scheme suﬀers either with
communication cost or Security issues. In this thesis we have given a generalize
7
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approach for all types of auction schemes, but it is more focused towards sealed bid
auction.According to [1,2], there are diﬀerent properties needed to satisfy to conduct
online auction.
1. Anonymity: Each Bidder’s information must be concealed. The identity of
one bidder should not be traced down by any other bidder.
2. Non repudiation: Bidders must not be able to deny on their bids after the
declaration of the result. No bidder can repudiate on their winning bid after
result declaration.
3. Unforgeability: No one should be able to make a fake bidder id in order to
participate in the auction and disturbs the auction proceeding.
4. Traceability: In special circumstances, it must be possible to identify the
winning bidder only after the result declaration.
5. Public Verifiability: The identity of a valid bidder can be veriﬁable. The
originality of the bidding message and accuracy of the tender must also be
veriﬁable by any one.
6. Integrity: The tender or the bid message must not be modiﬁed during the
auction process. No one should be able to modify the bid once submitted by
the bidder including the bidder.
7. Fairness: The bidding values must not be disclosed to anyone. They must be
kept private by the auction center. Every procedure involves in the auction
must be fair and emphasis should be given on the privacy.
8. Authentication: The authenticity of a valid bidder must be identiﬁed and
at the same time the authenticity of the auction center must be identiﬁed by
the every bidder.
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Electronic Auction expanded the range of commodities that can be sold or
purchased in a much orderly manner irrespective of the geographical locations and
physical limitations. As we will analyze later, in this thesis we have presented a
generalize approach which satisﬁes all the above properties. It is always necessary
for any online auction model to satisfy the properties mentioned above in order to
implement it securely and eﬃciently. Here we have used a blind signature scheme
to implement an E-Auction model.
1.6 Motivation
In this digital world with wide use of internet e-commerce has become an integral
part of everyday life. E-Auction is one of them and more and more organizations are
interested in this ﬁeld due to its reduced cost, human eﬀort and heavy popularity. As
these systems are not restricted to physical limitations and geographical presence,
they can be easily conducted over anytime and anywhere. The eﬃciency of
evaluation along with the fairness can be greatly enhanced through E-Auction
systems. Any unfair competition and manipulation of results can be restricted and
through information regarding the auction proceeding can be published in order to
keep the process transparent.
With these features, the challenge to develop a secure bidding system motivated
us while keeping all the restrictions in mind that must be imposed on such a system.
Researchers are constantly working in this ﬁeld to develop an electronic bidding
system that satisﬁes most properties to make it more secure. It is very hard to
satisfy all the property for an electronic bidding system. Moreover the eﬃciency of
these systems play a vital role in real life. Hence an elliptic curve implementation
will be of great use. There are other schemes which rely on discrete log problem
but they are computationally more costly as compared to elliptic curve. Hence
in this dissertation work we have presented a cryptographic protocol to build an
online bidding system which satisﬁes most properties of an e-auction system and
9
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implemented through a blind signature scheme based on elliptic curve discrete log
problem.
The blind signature itself satisﬁes some properties like anonymity, which are
necessary for an online bidding system. We have shown how complete anonymity
can be achieved without any repudiation and thus providing an eﬃcient solution to
develop a protocol to build electronic auction system which is the sole purpose of
this thesis.
1.7 Objective and Statement of Purpose
As indicated in the previous section, the objective here is to build an online bidding
system which is secure and must be eﬃcient. For eﬃciency we have adopted an
elliptic curve blind signature approach instead of a discrete log based blind signature.
Hence from it we can deduce the problem statement as
”To propose an electronic auction system Using blind signature protocol with
controlled traceability.”
1.8 Layout of The Thesis
In this thesis, ﬁrst we have proposed a simple and eﬃcient blind signature protocol
using elliptic curve discrete logariyhm problem and then implemented it to develope
an electronic auction scheme. We have analyzed the security of our schemes and
then provided the computational cost of those protocols. We have performed a
comparative analysis of our schemes with existing schemes and shown the results.
The thesis is organized as follows:
In chapter 2 we will describe the mathematical concepts related to our work and
illustrate the elliptic curve cryptography, its application and beneﬁts.
In chapter 3 we will present the literature review based on electronic auction and
its requirements. Apart from that we will also review blind signature schemes and
10
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its properties.
In chapter 4 we will propose an eﬃcient algorithm for blind signature using
elliptic curve cryptography and also develop a new secure electronic auction protocol
using that blind signature.We will analyze security issues related to it and campare
the result with other schemes.
In the end chapter 5 concludes our dissertation.
11
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Introduction to Elliptic Curve
Cryptography
In this chapter we have describe some of the basic mathematical concepts related
to the dissertation. The elliptic curve crypto system is discussed in detail and the
elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is studied along with its security hardness.
Diﬀerent parameters for elliptic curve digital signature is analyzed and ﬁnally a
comparative analysis of the key size required for diﬀerent algorithms is tabulated.
2.1 Mathematics Behind Cryptography
There are several public key cryptosystems that have been proposed and researchers
are still studying on some with great detail. Elliptic curve cryptosystem is one of
them and has gained a lot of attentions for the beneﬁts it has promised over other
cryptosystems.Every cryptosystem depends on the computational intractability of
certain mathematical problems and with technological advancement over the time
many systems either have been broken or the key size has been increased. With
increased key size those systems do not work eﬃciently in a conventional machine.
There are three types of systems which are considered to be safe, secure and eﬃcient
as mentioned in the previous chapter and are Integer factorization problem (IFP),
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) and Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
(ECDLP). The advantages of using an ECC based cryptosystem is the smaller key
12
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size, reduced storage and transmission requirement [11] (a 160 bit ECC public key
should provide comparable security strength to a 1024 bit RSA public key).
2.2 Basic Facts About ECC
Elliptic curve cryptography was ﬁrst proposed by Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller
independently in the year 1985. It is based on the intractability of solving the
elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem in the underlying ﬁeld.
2.2.1 Finite Field
A ﬁnite ﬁeld consists of a ﬁnite set of elements F , together with two binary
operations, addition and multiplication on F , that satisfy certain arithmetic
properties. The number of elements in the ﬁnite ﬁeld is called the order of the
ﬁeld. There exists a ﬁnite ﬁeld of order q, if and only if q is a prime power. Such a
ﬁnite ﬁeld is represented as Fq. If q = p
m, then p is called the characteristic and m
is called the extension degree Fq. Usually either q = p, where p is an odd prime or
q = 2m, where m is any positive integer. If q = p, the ﬁnite ﬁeld is called a prime
ﬁeld and if q = 2m, it is called a binary ﬁeld.
2.2.2 Elliptic Curve over Finite Fields
An elliptic curve is a cubic equation in two variables which can be deﬁned over a
ﬁnite ﬁeld Fp (prime ﬁeld where p is an odd prime) or F2m (binary ﬁeld with only two
values, 0 & 1). In this section we have discussed only about elliptic curves over prime
ﬁelds. If E(Fp) is an elliptic curve over ﬁnite ﬁeld, then # E(Fp) is the number of
points on the elliptic curve and is called the order of the elliptic curve. The elliptic
curve consists of a discrete set of points which satisfy the following equation over a
ﬁnite ﬁeld Fp,
y2 = (x3 + ax+ b)m
¯
odp (2.1)
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where a, b ∈ Fp and 4a3 + 27b2 = 0(m
¯
odp). For cryptography the elliptic curve
should be a nonsingular curve i.e the above equation should hold good such that
4a3 + 27b2 = 0(m
¯
odp) and has three distinct roots(real or complex). An elliptic
curve also has a special point which is called point at the inﬁnity and is denoted as
O.
2.2.3 Operations on Elliptic curve
The speciﬁc properties of a nonsingular curve allow us to deﬁne an addition operation
on two points of the elliptic curve E(Fp) to give a third elliptic curve point. This is
possible because of a rule called chord and tangent rule. With this point addition
operation, it forms a group with all the points on the elliptic curve E(Fp) along with
the point at inﬁnity O, which serves as its identity. The addition operation can be
best explained geometrically.
Let P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) be two diﬀerent points on an elliptic curve and
R = (x3, y3) is the sum of P and Q. R can be deﬁned by drawing a line through
P and Q which will intersect the curve in a third point. By taking the reﬂection of
that point on the x-axis, we will get the desired point R which is the sum of P and
Q. It is depicted in Figure 2.1.
Let P = (x1, y1) is a point on the elliptic curve and R = (x3, y3) is the double
of P . The point double operation can be best explained geometrically by drawing
a tangent to the point P which will intersect at another point on the curve. Taking
the reﬂection of that point on the x- axis, we will get the desired point R which is
the double of P . It is depicted in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.1: Addition of two points P and Q: R=P+Q
Figure 2.2: Doubling a point P: R=P+P=2P
The algebraic formula for point addition and point double can be derived from
the above geometrical description.
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• P +O = O + P = P for all P ∈ E(Fp)
• If P = (x, y) ∈ E(Fp), then −P = (x,−y) where −P is called the negation of
P such that P + (−P ) = (x, y) + (x,−y) = O.
• (Point Addition) If P = (x1, y1) ∈ E(Fp) and Q = (x2, y2) ∈ E(Fp), where
P = ±Q. Then P +Q = (x3, y3) ∈ E(Fp), where
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2 (2.2)
and
y3 = λ · (x1 − x3)− y1 (2.3)
where
λ = (y2 − y1)/(x2 − x1) (2.4)
• (Point Doubling) P = (x1, y1) ∈ E(Fp), where P = (−P ). Then 2 · P =
(x3, y3) ∈ E(Fp), where
x3 = λ
2 − 2x1 (2.5)
and
y3 = λ · (x1 − x3)− y1 (2.6)
where
λ =
(
3x1
2 + a
2y1
)
(2.7)
The point addition and point doubling operation require few arithmetic operations
like addition, subtraction, multiplication, division in the underlying ﬁeld Fp. Scalar
multiplication in ECC is the repetition of the point addition operation by a scalar
number of times over the ﬁnite ﬁeld Fp,
kP = P + P + .......P (ktimes) (2.8)
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2.3 Why ECC?
Elliptic curve cryptography has become the lure among the research community and
security ﬁrm because of its immense advantage and safety. While discrete logarithm
problem can be solved using sub exponential time running algorithm (Number Field
Sieve, pollard’s rho method), an elliptic curve discrete log problem is resistant to
any such attack. Moreover a public key cryptosystem which is based on integer
factorization or DLP requires higher size of keys as compared to the ECDLP based
system with the same level of security. This makes elliptic curve cryptosystem more
eﬃcient than any other public key primitives. Due to the smaller size key, ECC can
be applied in smart cards and wireless communication systems, where the devices
have less memory, bandwidth, and computational power.
Table 2.1: Comparable key sizes (in bits) [30]
Strength ECDLP DLP/IFP
80 160 1024
112 224 2048
128 256 3072
Elliptic curve can be very helpful in resource constrained environment like
smart card, wireless communication which are constrained to memory, bandwidth,
computation power etc. because of its smaller key size.
2.4 summary
This chapter provides an overall mathematical concepts required for our research
work to successfully complete the dissertation. We have described elliptic curve
cryptography and its beneﬁts.
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Table 2.2: Recommended minimum key sizes (in bits) [30]
Year Strength ECDLP DLP/IFP Keysize ratio
upto 2010 80 160 1024 1:6
2011-2030 112 224 2048 1:12
2030+ 128 256 3072 1:20
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Literature Survey
In this chapter we have studied and discussed various existing E-Auction protocols
and their processes. The drawbacks of several schemes have been analyzed and
brieﬂy depicted. We have also ﬁnd out the use of blind signature in E-Auction
scheme and its merits and demerits.
3.1 Literature Review
An auction can be divided in to four basic types, English auction, Dutch auction,
Sealed bid Auction and Vickrey auction. In English auction all the bids are opened
and every bidder must bid a higher amount than the previous bidding amount. The
one with the highest is the winner. Dutch auction is the reverse of the English
auction where all the subsequent bid must be lower than the previous bid amount.
The one with the lowest is the winner. In sealed bid auction all the bids are hidden
until the auction is over. In the opening phase the bids are disclosed and the winner
is decided. Vickrey auction is similar to sealed bid auction but here the bidder
with the highest bid will win and will pay the second highest bid amount. Most
E-Auction protocols are implemented through Sealed bid auction scheme because
of the convenience. Several E-Auction protocols have been designed so far but its
security is still a challenge. The growing demand as well as the tradeoﬀ between
security and eﬃciency always boost researchers to constantly work on this ﬁeld. Its
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always been very diﬃcult to satisfy all the required properties of an online auction
scheme, still researchers have extensively studied this area and proposed several
diﬀerent protocols.
Franklin and Reiter proposed a sealed-bid auction protocol [12] where a malicious
bidder cant deny on his bid. They have used a veriﬁable signature scheme to justify
their protocol. In [13], Kudo proposed a sealed-bid auction method with a time server
where after a certain time period the sealed bids are opened and evaluated. In [14],
Kikuchi, Hakavy and Tygar proposed an electronic auction scheme to improve the
privacy of bids such that the winner will be determined and known only by the
auctioneer. Chang C. C. and Chang Y. F. [15] proposed three anonymous auction
protocols to ensure bidders privacy. Here they have used a deniable authentication
scheme to check the validity of the bids where every bidder can bid arbitrarily and
anonymously. However, Jiang et al. [16] pointed out some security weakness in
Chang C. C. and Chang Y. F. scheme where bidder cannot detect the tampered
response message from the auctioneer. Hence Jiang et al. proposed an improved
scheme which prevents tampering attacks. Subsequently, Chang C. C. and Chang
Y. F. also provided an improved method for further enhancement [17].
In [18], Liaw et al. proposed an electronic online auction protocol to solve the
problem of the bidders deposit payment with a deposit deducting certiﬁcate. In
their scheme four parties were involved (Bidder, third party, Auctioneer and Bank).
However Chia-Chi Wu et al. [19]found some security drawbacks where the bidding
receipt can be forged by the bidder to claim that he is the valid auction winner.
Moreover it was unable to preserve the privacy of the bidders. Bidders information
leaked to other parties involved in the auction which doesnt preserve the anonymity
property. Even malicious bidders can forge the bid receipt sent by the third party
and can claim that he is a valid winner.
Therefore Wu et al. [19] designed an electronic auction protocol that improvises
Liaw et al. [18] scheme and was comparatively more secure and eﬃcient. They have
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used symmetric key encryption instead of asymmetric key encryption to enhance
the eﬃciency. But the security of their scheme totally rely on the trust of the
third party as it has all the information about the bidders which may aﬀect in
the subsequent auction. Much more emphasis has been given to the third party
instead of sharing the load. A bidder has to register every time he need to bid
which may be an overhead to both the bidder and the auctioneer. Moreover all
the bidding price and the sequence numbers are published on the web which leaked
the private information about losing bidders. If the third party is corrupted he may
provide all the information about a bidder either to a dishonest auctioneer or bidder.
Furthermore their security relies on the diﬃculty of solving the discrete logarithm
problem for the sealed bid. There exist some sub exponential running time algorithm
to solve discrete log problem. Therefore we have given an approach to implement an
electronic online auction using elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. We have
further used a blind signature scheme which is nothing but only a variation of digital
signature to design an E-Auction protocol.
As we have already mentioned, in order to eﬀectively design a secure and eﬃcient
online electronic auction protocol it has certain properties which need to be satisﬁed.
The following are some of the requirements which must be fulﬁlled [15, 18, 19].
• Anonymity: The real identity of the bidder shouldnt be disclosed. The main
objective of anonymity is to hide the bidder-bid relationship in order protect
bidders personal information.
• Un-forgeability: The bidders, auctioneer or the auction host must not be
able to forge the bid otherwise they can be impersonated.
• Non-Repudiation: None of the parties be able to deny on their action. The
winning bidder must not be able to deny after submitting the bid. Similarly
the auction host must not be able to deny an honest bidders bid receipt.
• Public Verifiability: There must be some mechanism through which all the
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parties can be publicly veriﬁed which includes evidence of registration, bidding
and winning bid.
• Traceability: The winning bidder must be identiﬁable after the auction. It
is necessary because in some situation bidder might not pay the winning bid
amount after winning the auction.
• Robustness: The auction proceeding must not be interrupted by corrupt
bidders which may alter the auction result.
• Fairness: The auction process need to be fair enough so that no malicious
bidder can collude with the auction host or the auctioneer to aﬀect the honest
bidders.
• Privacy: The bidders information must not be leaked in order to preserve the
privacy of the losing bidder. Moreover the bank account number and other
ﬁnancial details should not be known to the auctioneer.
• Confidentiality and Integrity: In some auction (sealed bid, Vickrey) the
bid amount must be conﬁdential until the bidding phase is over. The bid
message must not be modiﬁed during the transmission.
• One Time Registration: Every bidder can register only once and bid in all
subsequent auction without re-registering.
3.2 Blind Signature
Blind signature is nothing but a variation of the digital signature where the signer is
unaware of the content of the message. Furthermore anyone can verify the signature
on the message after unblinding it. David Chaum [10] introduced blind signature
to resolve the issue. According to Chaum, a sender can get a valid signature from
a signer without disclosing the content to the signer who signs the document. The
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signature can be publicly veriﬁed without knowing the secret of either party. The
process is illustrated below.
• Let B is a blinding function on message m, and B′ is the inverse blinding
function known only to the sender such that B(m) is a blind message sent to
the signer.
• Let S is a signing function known only to the signer who puts his sign on the
blind message B(m) and S ′ is the inverse signing function which is publicly
known. S(B(m)) is the signature on the blind message and sent back to sender.
• Sender unblinds the blind message using his secret function B′ and got the
valid signature on the message as B′(S(B(m))) = S(m).
• The signed message can be veriﬁed by anyone by applying the public key of
the signer as S ′(S(m)) = m.
The following ﬁgure depict the general procedure of a blind signature protocol.
Figure 3.1: Mechanism of Blind Signature
A blind signature has the following properties [20–22] which need to be satisﬁed
and for this reason we can use it in designing an E-Auction protocol.
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• Blindness: The signer should be unaware of the content of the message while
signing.
• Correctness: The signers public key must be used to verify the blind
signature.
• Authentication: A valid signature implies that the message has been
originated from a valid source.
• Integrity: No one should be able to modify the content of the message during
the transmission, otherwise it will not generate a valid signature.
• Non-Repudiation: The signer cant deny after signing a document if it
generates a valid signature.
• Un-forgeability: A valid signer can only generate a valid signature. None
other than the signer can generate a valid signature.
• Non-Reusability: Once a signature has been used to sign a document, it
cant be used to sign another message.
• Untraceability: After publishing the message-true signature pair, even the
signer will not be able to link to a message-blind signature pair.
According to the above properties, we can use a blind signature protocol to
design an E-Auction scheme but with some modiﬁcation. Usually blind signature
are designed to be untraceable and ﬁnds many application like E-Voting, E-Cash
etc. But an E-Auction scheme requires controlled traceability. We must be able to
trace the bidder when he doesnt pay after winning the auction. Again the auctioneer
must not be able to trace the bidder and his bid amount (message) when the auction
closes. For this reason a modiﬁed blind signature protocol has been proposed and is
applied in the auction protocol.
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In 1994 Carmenish proposed a blind signature scheme which was based on
discrete logarithm problem [23]. But in 1995 Harn [24] ﬁnd out that the previous
scheme doesnt satisﬁes the untraceability property. The signer could trace the blind
signature by using all the public parameters used in particular transaction and the
message-signature pair open to the public. Hoster [25] disagreed with Harn and
claim that the cryptanalysis of Carmenish made by Harn is incorrect because the
signer will ﬁnd two pair of signature when he will try to trace it. Later Lee et al. [26]
claimed that Hosters cryptanalysis is wrong and it could be possible to trace the
blind signature by the signer as he can keep all the parameters after signing the
blind message. In 2005 he proposed a modiﬁed scheme to overcome the lacunas of
the base paper.
These days elliptic curve cryptography has been widely popular due to its added
advantages as mentioned in the previous chapter. The ﬁrst blind signature scheme
on elliptic curve was proposed in 2003 which was based on Schnorr blind signature
scheme [27] and they have shown that the space requirement have been reduced
drastically in their scheme. They have demonstrated that in their proposed scheme
only 34% space was needed and total execution time was 6 times faster than the
previously proposed discrete log (DLP) based blind signature protocol. It is also
believed that elliptic curve discrete log problem (ECDLP) is harder to solve as
compared to integer factorization and discrete logarithm problem (DLP). Moreover
elliptic curve method provides almost same level of security as that of its counterpart
but with much less key size. As mentioned in the previous chapter 3072 bits RSA
key is required for a level of security which 256 bit ECC key can achieve.
An eﬃcient identity based blind signature scheme without bilinear pairing was
proposed by He et al. [28] in 2011. They used elliptic curve to design their protocol
in order to save the size of the signature and the running time. Their scheme was
proved to be secure in random oracle under the ECDLP.
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In 2013 Nayak et al. proposed an untraceable blind signature scheme [29] and
shown that his scheme is computationally more eﬃcient than He et al scheme [28].
The author proved that it was untraceable and even the signer can’t trace the
message-signature pair after declaring the parameters for veriﬁcation. As we have
seen for electronic auction traceability is one of the requirements. Hence in the next
chapter we have proposed another blind signature with controlled traceability to
facilitate electronic auction.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter we have studied and analyzed the literature related to blind signature
and E-Auction. Further we have described the blind signature, its properties and
how it can be applied to design an E-Auction protocol. We have also depicted
electronic auction and its requirements. In the next chapter we will propose a new
E-Auction protocol using blind signature based on ECDLP.
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In this chapter we have proposed a secure and eﬃcient E-Auction protocol using
blind signature based on elliptic curve cryptography. There are many schemes
on electronic auction which uses encryption method or digital signature based on
discrete logarithm problem. But in order to save the size and running time with same
level of security we have adopted an elliptic curve method to design an electronic
auction protocol using blind signature. Blind signature has inherent properties which
satisfy the requirements of E-Auction protocol. With a modiﬁed blind signature
scheme we can achieve most requirements of an electronic auction. Hence ﬁrst we
have proposed a blind signature scheme and then applied it to develop an E-Auction
protocol. Furthermore we have analyzed the security strength of our protocol and
the computational complexity of our scheme in the subsequent sections.
4.1 Proposed Blind Signature Protocol
We have modiﬁed Nayak et al. [30] scheme in order to make it traceable. In our
scheme there are two participants, signer and the requester(sender) who agree on
an Elliptic curve Ep(a, b) of order p. In our scheme there are 4 stages viz. Key
Generation, Blinding, Signing, Unblinding-Veriﬁcation as depicted in ﬁgure. The
operations on each phase are described below. G : Base Point, such that nG = O
n : number of points on Ep(a, b)
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O : Point at inﬁnity
x, r : Random no. chosen by signer
a, b : Random no. chosen by sender
m : Message
SHA-1 : Hash Function
4.1.1 Key Generation
1. The signer generates two random number x and r in Z∗p .
2. Calculate the following
Y = xG (4.1)
H = rG (4.2)
and
T = (H + Y ) (4.3)
Signer publishes his public parameters Y ,H ,T and keeps x and r private.
4.1.2 Blinding
1. Sender generates two random no. a and b in Z∗p , where a is called the blinding
factor.
2. Calculate
Q = bT (4.4)
u1 = SHA− 1(m) (4.5)
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u2 = (u1 − b) · a−1 (4.6)
K = bG (4.7)
3. Sender sends u2, the blind message to Signer.
4.1.3 Signing
1. After receiving u2, Signer put his signature on it thereby calculating
z = (r + x) · u2, z is the signature on the blind message.
2. Send back z to Sender.
4.1.4 Unblinding and Verification
1. After receiving z, Sender unblinds the message as,
Z ′ = (za + b)G (4.8)
2. Sender publishes his public parameters Q and K and keeps a and b as private.
3. The blind signature for message m is (Z ′, Q,K, T,m) which can be veriﬁed as
Z ′ +Q−K = u1 · T (4.9)
The mechanism is described in ﬁgure 4.1.
4.2 Analysis of the scheme
The security of the proposed scheme relied on the strength of the hash function and
diﬃculty of solving ECDLP. We have considered a hash function to be collision
resistant so that it will be diﬃcult to ﬁnd another message m′ for the original
message m , such that SHA− 1(m) = SHA− 1(m′). Our proposed scheme satisﬁes
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Figure 4.1: Blind Signature Protocol
the correctness, blindness and traceability property which we have proved in the
subsequent sections. We have analyzed the computation cost of our proposed scheme
and compare it with He et al. [28] and Nayak et al. [30].
4.2.1 Correctness
If the following equality holds then the signature is considered to be valid.
Z ′ +Q−K = u1T
Correctness Proof
Z ′ +Q−K
= (za + b)G+Q−K
= zaG + bG +Q−K
= zaG +Q +K −K
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= zaG +Q
= (r + x)u2aG+Q
= (rG+ xG)(u1 − b)a−1a+Q
= (H + Y )(u1 − b) +Q
= (u1 − b)T +Q
= u1T − bT +Q
= u1T −Q +Q
= u1T
4.2.2 Blindness
The proposed scheme satisﬁes the blindness property as the value of a and b are
known only to the sender and ﬁnding the value of b given T and Q depends on
the diﬃculty of ECDLP. Even after publishing the value of u1, one can’t reveal
the value of b or a. If someone got two message signature pair, (Z ′, u1, Q,K) and
(Z ′∗,u∗1,Q
∗,K∗) it won’t be possible to determine the blinding factor a. Hence our
scheme provides complete blindness.
4.2.3 Traceability
As we have already mentioned, we need a traceable blind signature protocol to
apply it in an E-Auction scheme. That’s why we modify Nayak et al. [30] blind
signature scheme which was claimed to be untraceable. Our proposed scheme
satisﬁes traceability property as mentioned below.
When a blinded message is sent to the signer for his signature, he can keep a record
of the value (u2, z). When the requester reveals (Z
′, u1) for the message m, signer
can’t be able to calculate a or b. But from Z ′ = (za+ b), he can get Z ′ −K = zaG
because K = bG and is revealed by requester. Say aG = P , then Z ′ − K = zP .
Now signer has (Z ′−K) and z, so he can ﬁnd z′−1. P ′ can be found as z′−1(Z ′−K).
Then he compares for every P ′, if Z ′ − K = z′P ′ and can ﬁnd the z for message
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m. Hence the signer can trace a blind signature with O(n2) where n is no of blind
signature signed by the signer. It can be used to trace the requester when needed.
4.2.4 Universally Verifiable
The blind signature can be veriﬁed by using the Signature pair (Z ′, K) and publicly
available parameters (Q, T ) for message m. Anyone can check its authenticity once
the sender reveals the signature pair (Z ′, K). Hence our scheme is universally
veriﬁable.
Now we can move forward to develop an electronic auction protocol and then analyze
the security of both the schemes together at the end of this chapter.
4.3 Proposed E-Auction Protocol
Now we will propose an E-Auction protocol using the above blind signature scheme.
Moreover we have used elliptic curve method to reduce the storage requirement
and computation speed with similar level of security. ECDLP is considered to
be harder to solve than integer factorization and DLP based technique. In most
E-Auction scheme anonymity is a major problem. In our protocol we have presented
a better solution as compared to existing schemes. There are 5 stages in our scheme
viz. Advertisement, Registration Setup, Registration Conﬁrmation, Bidding, Result
Declaration. All the steps in each stage is described below.
There are four parties involved in our electronic auction protocol. They are
namely Registration Manager(RM), The Third Party(TP) which can be acted as
the Signer, Bidders which can be viewed as the Sender and the Auctioneer which
can be thought of as the veriﬁer in correspondence with our proposed Blind Signature
protocol. Let us now discuss each phase separately with proper diagram wherever
required.
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4.3.1 Advertisement Phase
The auction will begin with an advertisement by the auctioneer. The base point
G over an elliptic curve is chosen. If su is the private key of the auctioneer and
pu = suG is the public key then the auction message M is signed by auctioneer as
Ssu(M) and send it to the Third Party to publish it on the web. It can be veriﬁed
by using his public key pu.
4.3.2 Registration Setup Phase
Every bidder need to register themselves before bidding. To maintain the anonymity
of individual bidder, each bidder need to register themselves with a registration
manager. They need to employ the following steps.
1. The Registration Manager(RM) generates his private keys t and xn randomly.
Then ﬁnd
S = tG (4.10)
and
Yn = xnG (4.11)
He publishes S and Yn which are his public keys.
2. Similarly Bidder generates his private keys a, b, c and xs randomly in Z
∗
p . Then
calculates
Ys = xsG (4.12)
and sends Ys to the Registration Manager(RM).
3. The RM ﬁnds
K1 = xnYs (4.13)
which is a secret key between RM and Bidder. RM sends back his public key
Yn to the bidder.
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4. Bidder computes the same secret key K1 as K1 = xsYn. Then he computes
the following
R = c(S +G) (4.14)
e = SHA− 1(T ime||R) (4.15)
e1 = c
−1e (4.16)
Then encrypts (Id, T ime, e1) using the secret key K1 and sends it to the RM.
As it is symmetric encryption, it will be fast.
5. After receiving the encrypted message, the RM will decrypt it using K−11 and
computes s as follows
s = t− e1SHA− 1(T ime)xn (4.17)
Then signed s using xn and send signedxn(s) to the bidder.
The information ﬂow of the phase is depicted in ﬁgure 4.2.
4.3.3 Registration Confirmation Phase
1. The Third Party(TP) generates his private keys x and r randomly in Z∗p and
computes his public keys as follows
Y = xG (4.18)
H = rG (4.19)
T = (H + Y ) (4.20)
and publishes his public parameters Y,H and T .
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Figure 4.2: Registration Setup
2. After receiving s from the RM, bidder needs to decrypt it using K−11 and then
calculates the signature s′ as follows
s′ = (s+ 1)c− e.SHA− 1(T ime).xs (4.21)
and sends (s′, e, T ime) and Ys to the Third Party(TP).
3. The TP veriﬁes the signature s′ as follows
e = SHA− 1(T ime, s′G+ e.SHA− 1(T ime).(Ys + Yn)) (4.22)
If the above equality holds true then the TP ﬁnds K2 the secret key as
K2 = xYs (4.23)
Then generates a pseudonym pn, encrypts (pn) using K2,put his signature
Signx(s
′, e, T ime) and sends back (Y, (pn)K2, Signx(s
′, e, T ime)) to the bidder.
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4. After receiving the message, bidder veriﬁes the signature using Y , computes
the secret key K2 and decrypts the encrpyted message to retrieve pseudonym
pn.
The steps involved in this phase has been depicted in ﬁgure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Registration Conﬁrmation
4.3.4 Bidding Phase
1. Bidder computes his public key Q as
Q = bT (4.24)
and publish it. Then he needs to blind his bid value. But before blinding he
ﬁnds the SHA− 1 of his bid, say u1. Then blinds u1 using the blinding factor
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a and his private key b as follows.
u2 = (u1 − b).a−1 (4.25)
Then ﬁnds K = bG and sends the blind bid message u2 to the Third Party to
get his signature.
2. The Third Party calculate the signature on the blind message as
z = (r + x).u2 (4.26)
but doesn’t know anything about the original bid value. Then he sends the
blind signature z to the bidder.
3. Bidder unblinds the signature to get the original one. He computes as
Z ′ = (za + b)G (4.27)
and publishes the signature (Z ′, u1, K).
4. Anyone can verify the signature. If the following equality holds then the
signature is indeed valid.
Z ′ +Q−K = u1.T (4.28)
Note that the bidder didn’t reveal the bid, yet it can be veriﬁed.
The bidding process is illustrated in ﬁgure 4.4.
4.3.5 Winner Determination Phase
1. Every bidder send their encrypted bid message to the Third Party along with
the signed message Z ′ and the pseudonym Signx(pn) issued to them by the
TP.
[Signx(pn), (bid, Z
′, Q,K)K2] (4.29)
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Figure 4.4: Bidding Phase
2. After receiving the message, the Third Party checks for Signx(pn), then use
the secret keyK2 related to the pseudonym to decrypt the message and retrieve
the bid and Z ′.
3. The Third party ﬁnds SHA − 1(bid) = u′1 and verify if Z ′ + Q − K = u′1T .
If satisﬁed then he accepts the bid and ﬁnds the max bid. The TP sends
(max bidK2 , Signx(pn)) to the bidder and publishes the (max bid, Z
′, Q,K)
so that it can be veriﬁed by anyone.
4. Now the bidder can claim himself as the winner.
4.4 Analysis and Result
In this section we will analyze the security and eﬃciency of our protocol. We have
also analyzed the requirement evaluation of our protocol. Then we have compare
our protocol with other existing protocols.
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4.4.1 Registration Correctness
We have already proved the correctness of the blind signature. Here we will prove
the registration correctness of the bidder. In order to verify the authenticity of the
bidder, anyone including the Third Party can verify the signature (s′, e, T ime).
If
e = SHA− 1(T ime, s′G+ e.SHA− 1(T ime)(Ys + Yn)) (4.30)
then the signature is a valid one and he can be authenticated. The proof is shown
below.
We know that
s = t− e1.SHA− 1(T ime).xn (4.31)
and
s′ = (s+ 1)c− e.SHA− 1(T ime).xs (4.32)
Putting the value of s in the above eqn.
s′ = (t− e1.SHA− 1(T ime).xn + 1)c− e.SHA− 1(T ime)xs
= (t+ 1)c− e.c−1.c.SHA− 1(T ime).xn − e.SHA− 1(T ime)xs
= (t+ 1)c− e.SHA− 1(T ime)(xn + xs)
Again Ys = xsG and Yn = xnG
Now
s′G+ e.SHA− 1(T ime)(Ys + Yn)
= s′G+ e.SHA− 1(T ime)(xs + xn)G
Putting the value of s′ in the above eqn. , we get
= (t+ 1)c.G− e.SHA− 1(T ime)(xn + xs)G+ e.SHA− 1(T ime)(xs + xn)G
= (t+ 1)c.G
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Again
R = c(S +G)
= c(tG+G)
= (t+ 1)c.G
Hence
s′G + e.SHA− 1(T ime)(Ys + Yn) == R
SHA− 1(T ime,R) = e
4.4.2 Security Analysis
The security of our protocol depends on the strength of one directional hash
function(SHA,MD) and the hardness of ECDLP. Then we will discuss some of the
attacks which are withstand by our protocol. Our protocol can withstand some
active attacks and are analyzed below.
• Forgery Attack
Given Y and G ﬁnding x from Y = xG is diﬃcult due to the ECDLP. Hence
the private component can never be calculated. Hence it will be diﬃcult for
the attacker to unblinds the message because of the private components a and
b. So he can never found u1. Moreover we have assumed our hash function
is collision resistant. So from the bid message, it is easy to ﬁnd the message
digest u1 but from u1 it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd the bid message as the hash function
is non-invertible. Moreover from the blind message an attacker needs to choose
two values from a, b and u1 randomly to ﬁnd the other value which is infeasible.
so given a valid signature (Z ′, u1, K, bid), it is impossible to ﬁnd another valid
signature (Z ′′, u′1, K
′, m′) which satisﬁes the veriﬁcation condition.
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• Key Only Attack
In order to successfully lunch the key only attack, the attacker needs to get a
valid signature. If he gets one then also he can not unblind the signature as he
doesn’t know the blinding factor and the private key of the requester i.e a and
b. The diﬃculty of ﬁnding b depends on the ECDLP and ﬁnding the value of
a depends on integer factorization which are considered to be hard problem in
cryptography.
• Known Message Attack
In known message attack, the attacker generates a valid signature for his own
message m′. Here he has access to two or more message-signature triplet say
(Z ′, u1, m′) and (Z ′′, u′1, m
′′). Here the attacker can generate another signature
Zs = Z
′+Z ′′ for message m if he can ﬁnd h(m) = h(m′)+h(m′′) which is very
diﬃcult if the hash function is preimage resistant. Moreover he also needs to
ﬁnd the value of u2 which required to ﬁnd a and b. The problem now depends
on solving ECDLP which is considered to be very hard.
• Chosen Message Attack
In chosen message attack, the attacker can make the signer sign two message
m′ and m′′ for him. Then he can calculate a new signature Zs = Z ′ + Z ′′. If
the attacker can ﬁnd h(m) = h(m′) + h(m′′) and the blind message u2 for his
message m then he can forge the message signature. But it is very diﬃcult
to ﬁnd the hash value of a message m which is same as the hash value of the
given messages m′ and m′′. The diﬃculty also depends on solving the ECDLP
to get b in order to ﬁnd the blind message u2.
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• Eavesdropping Attack
If attacker wants to eavesdrop on the communication between any bidder
and Registration Manager or Third Party for his beneﬁts, it will not be an
advantage for him as the data ﬂow are encrypted with the Session keys K1
and K2 and signed by the respective entities. Due to conﬁdentiality and
authenticity, the attacker will not be beneﬁted.
• Replay Attack
An attacker cannot retrieve the id of any bidder as the message sent to the
Registration Manager is encrypted with the session key K1. He won’t be able
to ﬁnd either e1 or s. Similarly due to the session key K2 between bidder and
Third Party, he won’t be able to ﬁnd the pseudonym pn. So the attacker can’t
replay any of the message.
• Impersonate Attack
It will not be possible to impersonate either the bidder or the registration
manager or the Third Party because all have used either their session key to
encrypt the message or the public key to sign the message. The session key
is generated from the private component of both the parties involved in the
communication. So it will be known only to them which prevent malicious
persons to impersonate honest members involved in the auction.
• Identity Theft Attack
In our proposed scheme we are not using bidder’s id for authentication. Instead
we are using the time stamp (Time) for authentication which prevents the
bidder from the risk of identity theft. Even the pseudonym pn provided by
the Third Party is only known to them. However in case the third party is
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corrupted, he may reveal the pseudonym pn but still the real identity of the
bidder is concealed.
4.4.3 Requirements Analysis and Evaluation
There are certain requirements which need to be fulﬁlled while developing an
E-Auction protocol. We will analyze all these requirements brieﬂy in the subsequent
sections.
• R1 Anonymity
The information about every bidder must be hidden from others. For this
purpose we have developed an E-Auction protocol in which every bidder must
register their real identity with a Registration Manager who is not an active
member of the auction. It only keeps the identity of the bidders. The Third
Party will authenticate each bidder and assign a pseudonym. Every bidder
blind their bid value and send it to the TP to get his signature. So all the
information about the bidder including his bid value is hidden from everyone
until the auction is closed. In the winner determination phase the bidder
sends his bid value only to the TP to determine the max bid. So anonymity is
preserved for all bidders even if the TP is corrupted. Because he has only the
pseudonym and bid value which can’t be linked to ﬁnd the real identity of the
bidder.
• R2 Unforgeability
An attacker may try to forge the bid but fails due to the blinded bid which
needs to solve ECDLP to ﬁnd b and a. Moreover all the necessary information
are encrypted with the session key and/or signed by the sender. Hence forgery
attack is not possible which is also depicted in the Security Analysis.
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• R3 Non-Repudiation
The bidder as well as the TP must not be able to deny of their act. The
bidder cannot deny of casting the bid because the signature Z ′ can be veriﬁed
by using the eqn. Z ′ +Q−K = u1T where Q is the public key of bidder.
Similarly the TP can not deny of receiving the bid as the same signature is
also veriﬁed by using his public key T .
• R4 Public Verifiability
The signature Z ′ can be veriﬁed by everyone after publishing the signature
parameter (Z ′, Q,K, T, u1). Moreover the ﬁnal winner bid can also be veriﬁed
by everyone once the TP publish the (Z ′, max bid). Because anyone can now
ﬁnd u2 = SHA− 1(max bid) and verify the signature Z ′. The authenticity of
every bidder can also be veriﬁed by anyone.
• R5 Traceability
The winning bidder or any bidder who doesn’t follow the auction rule can
be identiﬁable using the traceability property as previously described in the
proposed blind signature protocol section.
• R6 Fairness and Robustness
This protocol satisﬁes the fairness property because even if the malicious bidder
or auctioneer collude with the TP, they will not gain any information about
the honest bidder that can harm him in the continuing or future auction.
• R7 Privacy
Our protocol maintain the privacy of every bidder during the auction. It also
preserves the privacy of the losing bidder even after the winner determination
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phase in the auction.
• R8 Integrity and Confidentiality
The integrity and conﬁdentiality of the protocol is achieved through blind
signature and the session key. No one can ﬁnd the bid value before the winner
determination phase due the blindness property. No one can change the bid
value once signed by the TP else the signature cannot be veriﬁed. The strength
depends on the ECDLP and the hash function.
• R9 One Time Registration
In our scheme the bidder needs to register himself every time for a fresh auction.
If the bidder registers every time then he will get a diﬀerent s and s′ for diﬀerent
e. So it will be diﬃcult to link the bidder and preserves his anonymity else
one can easily link the bidder and aﬀect the future auction outcome.
4.5 Result Analysis
We evaluate the eﬃciency of our blind signature protocol and compare it with
two recent schemes. Let I denotes the modular inverse operation, M denotes the
point multiplication and H denotes the hash operation. Our scheme is far more
computationally feasible than the other two schemes. The total computational load
on our scheme is 4M+2H+1I. The result is shown in Table 4.1.
The proposed E-auction protocol is computationally slightly more costly with
higher security and it fulﬁlls all the requirements needed to be satisﬁed by an
E-Auction protocol. Moreover it saves considerable amount of space in terms of
key size as it is implemented through elliptic curve. The comparison result is shown
in Table 4.2.
T(exp)- Exponential Time, T(S)- Symmetric Key Time, T(ME)- Modular
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Table 4.1: Computational Time of diﬀerent Blind Signature Protocols
Schemes Blinding Signing Verifying
He et al. [28] 5M+2H+11 1M 2M+3H
Nayak et al. [29] 6M+1H 0M 3M
Proposed scheme 2M+1H+1I 0M 2M+1H
Exponentiation Time, T(h)- Hashing Time, T(SM)- Scalar Multiplication Time,
T(PA)- Point Addition Time
Table 4.2: Comparison of Computational cost of diﬀerent E-Auction Schemes
Schemes Advertisement Registration Bidding Winner
Determination
Liaw et al. [18] nT(exp) 2nT(exp)+5nT(h) 5nT(exp) 0
Wu et al. [19] nT(exp)+nT(h) 2nT(exp)
+2nT(S)+nT(h)
nT(ME)+
4nT(exp)
nT(exp)+
nT(ME)+2nT(S)
Chen et al. [31] T(exp)+T(ME) 2nT(exp)+
4nT(ME)+2nT(h)
6nT(exp)+
7nT(ME)+2nT(h)
2nT(ME)+
2nT(exp)
Proposed
scheme
T(exp)+T(h) 6nT(SM)+
2nT(PA)+2nT(exp)
+4nT(S)+5nT(h)
4nT(SM)+
2nT(PA)+nT(h)
nT(SM)+
2nT(PA)+4nT(S)
+2nT(exp)+nT(h)
In Table 4.3 we have given the requirement evaluation result. Our scheme satisﬁes
all the requirements which are needed for an electronic auction except the last as
mentioned in the previous section.
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Table 4.3: Requirement Analysis and Comparision
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9
Liaw et al. [18]
√ √ × √ √ × × √ ×
Wu et al. [19]
√ √ √ √ √ √ × √ ×
Chen et al. [31]
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ ×
Proposed scheme
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ ×
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Conclusion
In this thesis we have proposed an electronic auction scheme using a blind signature
protocol. As we know a blind signature is a diﬀerent form of digital signature,
we have ﬁrst proposed a blind signature protocol according to the requirements of
E-Auction and then employ it to design an electronic auction scheme. We have
implemented both the protocols which are based upon elliptic curve cryptography.
Our proposed blind signature is far more eﬃcient than the competent schemes which
we have shown in the result. Moreover an ECC based protocol is more eﬃcient in
terms of space complexity with a similar level of security. Hence we have adopted
ECC to design an E-Auction protocol which produces considerable result with better
security. The eﬃciency can further be improved using VLSI implementation and we
can also include the transactional ﬂow in our proposed E-Auction scheme with some
extra computational cost.
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